Are women chokers?

Steven Landsburg thinks they might be, and that’s why we don’t see many top female executives.
If his argument is to apply in the corporate world, it means that the decisions and actions of top executives really are marginal, in the same way that fighting over a match point at Wimbledon is. Of course, the really marginal decisions could be occurring urther down the corporate ladder, where the real competition takes place. By the time you reach the higher echelons of lower-senior management, perhaps there are fewer women for this reason.

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Political posturing on City bonuses

Tim Worstall is surely right when he claims that Peter Hain’s call for two-thirds City bonuses to be donated to charity, is just political posturing within the Labour Party.

Let’s take it as given that no-one seriously considers this idea as a starter. After all, it is largely the workers that benefit from City largesse, and the payouts are tied to performance in a way that simply doesn’t happen in many other firms. And let’s leave aside even the issue of freedom of the individual to choose how to spend their money, which in many cases does including donating to charity. And at least ensures that the auction houses of London and car factories in Maranello are kept busy.
I have two problems with this posturing. Firstly, the implicit assumption that giving to charity is always and everwhere a good thing. Charity can be extremely wasteful because  there is no system other than posturing and shouting to indicate where and how money should be spent. Special interest groups can dominate and the overlap in objectives and activities of many charities is simply wasteful.

The second point is about the Labour Party. I’m afraid I can’t dismiss as easily as Tim does this jockeying for position. Not ten years ago  Labour MPs were queuing up to show off their New Labour credentials, enthusiastically embracing privatisation, NHS reform and free markets generally. Peter Hain’s rant on bonuses has little chance of being implemented but it seems a presage to a what everyobody clearly expects will be a very left-leaning, state-centred agenda under Gordon Brown. I hope I’m wrong but this Chancellor has shown little enthusiasm for anything other than throwing money at problems. With absolute power, why won’t this continue?

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Lord Lawson takes a pop at Stern

The former Chancellor is not convinced.

Lord Lawson told MPs: “One of the oddities of this whole field is that you apply weather forecasting to economic forecasting to demographic forecasting, you pile uncertainty on uncertainty and then apparently you come to a certain conclusion of what we should do.

But that criticism would apply to any proposal, not just one to spend money to reduce emissions today. Lawson suggests mitigating against the effects of a warming climate, i.e. just accepting that the climate will warm and making investments to deal with it. He also suggests that Britain would benefit enormously from climate change (but presumably the already hot parts of the world can go hang).

But, are we so conservative, or have such a preference for the status-quo, that it clouds our view as to how quickly we could adjust to this problem? Or does the prevailing attitude reflect an inherent (and irrational?) psychology of ‘justness’ towards the earth; a belief that we should live with it, but not affecting it?

I have to admit that I suffer from a bit of both.

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In which Brad Delong is misunderstood. I think

Brad Delong writes

Bill Gates, Paul Allen, Steve Ballmer and the other millionaires and billionaires of Microsoft are brilliant, hardworking, entrepreneurial and justly wealthy.  But only the first 5 percent of their wealth can be justified as an economic incentive to encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise.  The next 95 percent would create much more happiness and opportunity if it were divided evenly among  U.S. citizens or others than if they were to consume any portion of it

Many of the commenters on Marginal Revolution appear to think that Brad is advocating extreme wealth redistribution. The article actually talks about the importance of education in narrowing inequality and I think the relevance of the passage above is that it may be seen as an argument for some sort of progressive taxation, or education funding policy (which would of course imply a redistribution of some sort, not at the personal level that the passage above suggests)

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Simon Heffer is a libertarian. Maybe

On the subject of the Manchester ‘supercasino’.

I am a committed libertarian. It is why I write here, week in, week out about the need for the small state, low taxation, the diminution of welfarism and the promotion of individual responsibility

Thats OK. Then we have this,

Libertarianism can only go so far.

Also OK. And we conclude with this,

After all: can somebody explain to me the difference between legalising casinos?

I can’t. A sort of consistency compels you to accept the legalisation of prostitution and drugs if you allow casinos. But Simon Heffer doesn’t feel so compelled. He argues that the function of a state is to protect me from “preventable evils”. This is even more doctrinaire than libertarian paternalism, which at least allows individual freedom.

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Is discrimination bad?

I’m confused over the Catholic gay adoption issue. Regardless of the law banning discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, what gay couple in their right mind would approach a Catholic adoption agency? Surely the problem would just go away (unless there are gay couples who just want to irritate Catholics)

So we are left with the principal of whether it’s right to discriminate against people. Short post then, right?

Well, if it weren’t for the fact that we discriminate against people all the time, it would be. Just consider this: in the UK you can’t vote till you’re 16, drive till you’re 17 or buy booze till your 18. The assumption is that the rights to the under age concerned would not be balanced by the responsibilities; few 17 yeard olds would be driving their own cars. There is also the potential for huge costs on the rest of us if 16 yeard olds really are bad drivers, or younger voters would have poorer decision-making skills. The line may be arbitrary but it has to be drawn somewhere in these example and I guess few people would quibble with this kind of discrimination.

Similarly I don’t see a problem with a seller of prestige cars who, with limited time, concludes that race is better indicator of likely income and engages with the WASP instead of a black person. In the latter, the market would drive out discrimination if the signal of race as a predictor of income breaks down. If discrimination was about job ability say, then similarly, as new information enters the market, the signal value of race is eroded.

So what is different about this case of discrimination?

Two things are critical to understanding the issue in a social policy context. Firstly, discrimination means making using base rate information about a group in respect of the individual If you’re base rate data is telling you that gay couples pose a more significant risk to children than hetero couples, that’s a risk it would be unwise to ignore. Acknowledging the risk put us in a better position to make a trade-off between the rights of the couple and the child. It does not mean that a blanket ban all gay couples adopting is required. The same issue arises with foster parents: data show that stepchildren are at a greater risk of child abuse from stepparents than natural parents; again, it’s sensible to be aware of these risks when balancing rights and responsibilities.

Even if the information tells us something about the group, we don’t have to use it at all against the individual. And that’s the second important point; just because we know that groups differ on certain characteristics, we have an ethical choice whether to discriminate in different situations. Numerous studies show the men are, on average, better than women at math. It doesn’t mean all men are though – just as all 16 year olds wouldn’t make poor drivers. What makes this example different from the driver though is the balance between liberty and freedom of women (especially given all the other characteristics that may make a successful maths teacher) and the costs to society. We have decided that women should not be treated differently to men.

As gay adoption has only been recently allowed, there is clearly very little data on risks, but a lot is known about gay individuals, and a great deal is known about what is good for the child. A blanket ban on gay adoption probably is unethical, just as a blanket ban on investment bankers adopting is (because of there greater likely absence from the home), but is it unwise to consider the particular risks that any couple, including the specific risks of a gay couple*, may pose to a child? Probably not.

*There is no such thing as an arbitrary gay couple obviously, but like anything in life, there are degrees of being gay, just as there are some investment bankers who are away from home more than others.

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Economics in a thousand words

I think this is quite cool.

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Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment

Bestial acts in the name of consumer protection? – itunes edition.

Full Disclosure: I own 2 Apple computers, and ipod and have been using Apple’s for 15 years.

The Norwegian consumer body has ruled that songs downloaded from itunes must be playable on other machines. Maniacal Apple fans may see this forced union of itunes with non-Apple hardware as the exploitation of a classy and refined product by a queue of unworthy and inappropriate upstarts. A manifestation of techno-beastiality. I can’t sympathise with such jealousy so won’t comment. But the concerns of some who fear for innovation are more pressing.

Music companies dithered over digital music and their lawyers showed more creativity, admittedly in creating arguments to shut down Napster and co. Into this melee stepped Apple. It’s adorable hardware appealed to gadget freaks; music loving non-tecchies thought itunes a simple and intuitive way to buy music. Exclusivity between hardware and software was critical to the consumer proposition of making it easier to pay for digital music rather than steal it.

Apple’s own Fairplay copy protection system was also key to convincing record companies to buy in. Without exaggeration Apple can claim to have created the market for digital music.

So why do Norway, France and others want to rid themselves of this turbulent, innovative, profit hungry high priest of technology? What’s the problem if you can only play itunes songs on ipods?

Microsoft users will be familiar with the problems caused by a dominant standard with few alternatives: stuck with a second best that you are forced to use because everyone else does; or you buy a rival non-compatible system. In this case, music lovers with files in different formats would have to buy additional players, or also purchase the CD versions and transfer them to their ipods (not always possible with individual songs). This is a genuine consumer hassle with real costs. There’s also the argument that the consumers should not face limitations on their rights; having paid for the music, they should not be tied to a specific player. There is also the technical argument that Apple’s dominance in the market for players and distribution results in higher prices, especially for itunes.

The last argument is unlikely to be true. 99c does not look like exploitative pricing, even if it does represent a large mark-up over distribution costs. The size of the mark-up in this case is a red-herring: ‘normal’ mark-ups over marginal cost are appropriate in many industries, but when you’re distribution cost is essentially zero, this pricing rule won’t cover the fixed costs. There are a variety of solutions, one of which is to charge a high (but obviously market-bearable) per use price. This could lead to very high profits but this should not matter if itunes faces pricing constraints from competitors. A comparison of prices on itunes with HMV, for example, suggests this is so.

The monopoly profits then are just the incentive that forced Apple to tread where others had failed. In time the profits will erode naturally through the competitive process. Forcing the issue and eliminating high profits may blunt incentives for Apple and other firms to innovate further. The argument is similar to that used by pharma companies for the maintenance of patent laws. And there is something to this argument. Without a profit motive, a company won’t do anything. In the then uncertain market for digital music, there was either big failure or big success in the offing.

Except that the innovation has been done and continuing protection would reward past innovation. The presence of rival music stores may lead to the conclusion that innovation is not hampered by Apple’s protection. But, counter intuitively, the more rival stores and formats there are, the more the consumer is harmed and the more important it is for Apple to open up the software. Otherwise consumers’ either restrict themselves to buying from itunes, or buy additional players in order to enjoy the wider choice of music.

The Norwegian proposals would affect all companies. And if the music companies abandon their rigd adherence to DRM, the market would then be completely open. Would there be a return to pre-ipod days and chaos? It’s doubtful.. Behaviourally, downloading music and paying for it is pretty well ingrained and easy. Illegal downloads and file sharing still happen, and always will and some stores will surely suffer. But the survivors will be those who focus on innovation and meeting customers’ expectations. Far from damning the Euro-muddlers, proponents of the free market should welcome the intervention on this occasion.

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Where have all the childminders gone?

I have an interest in childcare so this Opinion piece by Janet Daley caught my eye. She laments the absence of grandparents, and feels guilty herself at pursuing her career instead of offering support to her struggling daughter. Her central question:

Why are educated working women, who are more highly paid than ever before, having to fall back into dependence on extended family arrangements that were once the province of the poor?

Her answer is stupefyingly simple:

One of the more obvious reasons is that the Government has become heavily involved in the business of childcare: turning it into a regulated, licensed industry that must meet inspection standards has made it much more expensive.

And so she’s right. Sort of. My local council produces a handy booklet outlining the approved childminders, their specialities, locations, hours etc. But is all this regulation necessary? Surely in a free market, interested people can offer their services at going rates and parents will learn, through trial and error, who are the good providers.

Unfortunately, Janet is ridden with a memetic cancer that has eaten away her faculties of analysis and left her to bemoan all the ills of the world on ‘regulation’. Amazingly, she provides part of the real answer herself, in the quote above, but let’s go back and examine her claim that regulation is the real evil here.

Firstly I can think of several reasons why grandparents of today, unlike yesteryear, do not indulge in childcare, and why childcare is more expensive.

  1. Grandparents of today are wealthier and healthier; my in-laws are currently on a 3-week holiday in India. Two years ago they went on a 3-month holiday around the world. The absence of grandparents is more a tale of the greater freedom they have to enjoy their holiday homes, friends, coke habits etc.
  2. We are wealthier today, because we have a more mobile and flexible workforce, which means we are more likely to move away from our grandparents. My own parents live 300 miles from me, and my mum lives 4000 miles from her parents.
  3. More women have chosen to work, making us wealth, so as well as reducing the supply of possible childminders, there has been increased demand, both of which would push up prices. As Ms Daley herself points out without realising it, “Why are educated working women, who are more highly paid than ever before…”. There are other opportunities for women today, other than childminding.

Note that 2 above also suggests some of form of regulation; in the sepia-tinted hallucinations of Ms Daley, Miss Marple would have been happy to look after the children while solving crimes in some Arcadian bliss. Today, the shuffling bag of bones in on Upper St. could be a retired judge or dope dealer. Regulations on background checks etc. are there because there is an enormous information gap between buyers and sellers. As in any modern economy, he turgid formality of the law replaces the casual rules of social conduct, in a way that is largely unavoidable.
I would also add that the parents Ms Daley sympathises with have a more precious (=litigous) attitude towards their childrens upbringing today. They are not willing to tolerate the sorts of scrapes and knocks so beloved of the children in Enid Blyton books.

I think a more interesting question is, why is a cleaner, at £8/hour, so much more expensive than a registered childminder, at about £20/day?

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Posted in Baby Boot Economics, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Does everything looks like a nail?

An entertaining debate ensues over at The Economist, and in the comments at Marginal Revolution over whether the implications of applying of a zero discount rate in the Stern Report for the issue of abortion. Can it be consistent, asks the economist:

I am still chewing over the full import of the moral intuition that people born 100 years from now have just as much right to, say, live in Bangladesh, as those born today. But as one does, when one is chatting with economists, I became curious about what this moral intuition would mean if we actually applied it. The most obvious example is abortion. If we cannot discount the interests of the fetus simply because it is not yet with us as a person, then how can one morally justify legal abortion as a coherent national policy?

I won’t repeat many of the good comments from MR, except to say that a) I don’t believe why we need be absoutely consistent in the application of utilitarian ethics, and b) being consistent does NOT for me imply we give full rights to unborn foetuses, not least because the logical extension is that we encourage maximisation of pregnancy.

The more important point I wanted to make is about whether it makes any sense to apply economics to the abortion debate in this way. A oft-heard criticism of economists (heard by me, anyway) is that when all you possess is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. When discussing the economics of climate change, I don’t see any great problem in assuming that future as-yet-unborn generations should be treated the same as current ones. But why does the abortion debate need to be consistent with this utilitarian approach? If we demand consistency, then surely if we do as Bush would like and ban stem cell research and abortion then presumely the anti-Sterns can’t have any complaint with the application of zero discount rates?

I don’t think the tools that do a reasonable job of attending to the issues in Stern are necessarily the best for understanding the abortion debate. And there is simply no need for consistency in approach between the two issues. Perhaps sometimes we just have to accept the limitations of our tools to some problems, or at least the limited application of them. Indeed, because this is ostensibly an economists debate, there is the possibilty that the discussion of discount rates/rates of time preference have been over-egged, and more important issues overlooked.

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