Why do sub-optimal policies arise through the political process? Why do misconceptions about, for example immigration, survive year after year? Bryan Caplan believes voter irrationality is to blame. The public hold not just weird but contrary beliefs to experts in the field; the conclusion is to leave complex decision making to elites of experts (or markets).
I have a few issues with Bryan’s analysis. His example of immigration strikes me less as a story of voter irrationality and more of one about the different weights put on first and second order effects by the average voter and experts respectively; laypeople frequently fail to see or follow through the ultimate consequences of policies, stopping at the harm that reaches them personally. In that sense, both sets of people can claim to be right; immigration can cause job losses and social upheaval (short-term view) but there are also benefits in terms of new opportunities and lower prices (long-term view). Laypeople can’t ‘see’ the benefits however, in the way that job losses are visible. Perhaps loss aversion also makes them worry more about the losses (which may definitely be theirs) than the gains (which may accrue to others).
However, I think he’s on to something when considering the persistence of false beliefs I the face of strong evidence.
Steven Pinker wrote in the Blank Slate about (innate) ‘folk’ theories we hold about a number of areas, including epidemiology and physics. Their innateness and accessibility to the mind make them very difficult to overcome, particularly with the sort of second order thinking that prevails in economics. A belief in a sort of Malthusian economics is probably innate, originating in a time when the possibility of opening new frontiers of production was minimal. It is difficult to go from this sort of folk thinking to seeing how technology can change the calculus of scarcity. But does this make voters ignorant or irrational?
To assume irrationality is to endow the average voter with an understanding of the theory, who then chooses to ignore it, perhaps because cognitive dissonance hurts. I can see this clearly for religious beliefs, but is it true of all economic beliefs? I’m not sure. Despite most (all?) economist subscribing to the same universal truth about international trade, there are differences in the emphases given to the effects depending on the policy context. For example, economists may emphasise the need to protect workers from the effects of trade in a climate of general depression, even whilst holding the view that trade is generally beneficial. This can cloud the issue for the public and make it far from clear that there is agreement.
I agree with Bryan’s ultimate solution though which is that someone has to tell the Emperor he’s naked. The experts have to stand up and challenge the public’s misconceptions. This goes hand-in-hand with Burke’s vision of democracy, where elected officials are slaves to their judgement (or the judgement of experts) rather than public opinion. The problem of applying this to economics though is that the subject is not enough of a hard science, like evolutionary biology, to counter the claims of cranks and bigots who can rely on credible sounding cause-effect mechanisms to posit outcomes that almost certainly aren’t true, but just could be as far as clueless voters are concerned. I would personally love the equivalent of a Dawkins in economics to ridicule the irrational/ignorant beliefs of the public. Even Paul Krugman, who has written widely read articles which make you almost fearful to believe in anything other than free trade, has apparently not had a widespread effect.
Perhaps the real answer lies in giving the public the means to evaluate alternative policies, and I don’t just mean information, but actually teaching them how to use that information. Essentially, we should teach individuals how to be empiricists.
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